| Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms AS Nesterov Journal of Economic Theory 170, 145-168, 2017 | 20* | 2017 |
| Efficient lottery design O Kesten, M Kurino, AS Nesterov Social Choice and Welfare 48 (1), 31-57, 2017 | 7 | 2017 |
| Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules AY Kondratev, AS Nesterov Public Choice 183 (1), 187-210, 2020 | 4* | 2020 |
| Identifying Bid Leakage In Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach D Ivanov, A Nesterov Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 69-70, 2019 | 4 | 2019 |
| Moral Wiggle Room Reverted: Information Avoidance is Myopic H Moradi, A Nesterov HSE Working papers, 2018 | 4 | 2018 |
| Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings AY Kondratev, AS Nesterov arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.08003, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules AY Kondratev, E Ianovski, AS Nesterov arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.05082, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions S Bonkoungou, AS Nesterov arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.06166, 2020 | 1 | 2020 |
| Reforms Meet Fairness Concerns In School And College Admissions S Bonkoungou, A Nesterov Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 234, 2020 | | 2020 |
| How to Divide When There Isn't Enough: From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the Axiomatics of Resource Allocation. A Nesterov JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 58 (2), 498-500, 2020 | | 2020 |
| ACM EC 2019-PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION D Ivanov, A Nesterov, H Yan, S Das, A Lavoie, S Li, B Sinclair, ... | | 2019 |
| Three essays in matching mechanism design A Nesterov Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2016 | | 2016 |
| School Choice With Advice: The Adaptive Acceptance Rule AS Nesterov | | 2015 |
Aleksei Y. KondratevNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsVerified email at hse.ru
