The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08821, 2016 | 49 | 2016 |
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021 | 36 | 2021 |
A unified framework for strong price of anarchy in clustering games M Feldman, O Friedler International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 601-613, 2015 | 27 | 2015 |
99% revenue via enhanced competition M Feldman, O Friedler, A Rubinstein Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 443-460, 2018 | 23 | 2018 |
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets T Ezra, M Feldman, O Friedler ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (2), 38-44, 2020 | 15 | 2020 |
Control flow error localization O Friedler, W Kadry, A Nahir, V Sokhin US Patent 9,251,045, 2016 | 15 | 2016 |
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements: Abstract A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 17 …, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |
Architectural failure analysis O Friedler, W Kadry, A Nahir, V Sokhin US Patent 9,569,345, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |
Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing O Friedler, W Kadry, A Morgenshtein, A Nahir, V Sokhin 2014 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 1-6, 2014 | 13 | 2014 |
Simple mechanisms for agents with complements M Feldman, O Friedler, J Morgenstern, G Reiner Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 251-267, 2016 | 12 | 2016 |
Convergence to strong equilibrium in network design games M Feldman, O Friedler ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 43 (3), 71-71, 2015 | 2 | 2015 |
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements M Feldman, O Friedler, J Morgenstern, G Reiner arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.07939, 2016 | 1 | 2016 |
Simple Auctions for Agents with Complements O Friedler, G Reiner | | |