| Strategyproofness-exposing mechanism descriptions YA Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, C Thomas National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023 | 22 | 2023 |
| The short-side advantage in random matching markets L Cai, C Thomas Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 257-267, 2022 | 14 | 2022 |
| Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness A Rubinstein, RR Saxena, C Thomas, SM Weinberg, J Zhao Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
| Tiered random matching markets: Rank is proportional to popularity I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Saberi, C Thomas, G Zhao arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.05124, 2020 | 10 | 2020 |
| Classification of priorities such that deferred acceptance is osp implementable C Thomas Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 860-860, 2021 | 9 | 2021 |
| Implementation in advised strategies: Welfare guarantees from posted-price mechanisms when demand queries are np-hard L Cai, C Thomas, SM Weinberg arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04342, 2019 | 9 | 2019 |
| Classification of priorities such that deferred acceptance is obviously strategyproof C Thomas arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.12367, 2020 | 8 | 2020 |
| Representing all stable matchings by walking a maximal chain L Cai, C Thomas arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04401, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms YA Gonczarowski, C Thomas Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 455-466, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Maximally recoverable codes: The bounded case V Gandikota, E Grigorescu, C Thomas, M Zhu 2017 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and …, 2017 | 3 | 2017 |
| Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design A Ganesh, C Thomas, SM Weinberg arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.07566, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis YA Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, G Ishai, C Thomas National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier S Ron, C Thomas, SM Weinberg, Q Zhang arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.08241, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive C Thomas arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.02142, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Explainable Mechanism Design C Thomas Princeton University, 2023 | | 2023 |
| On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms. YA Gonczarowski, C Thomas CoRR, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms Y Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, C Thomas | | 2022 |
| Expansion in the Johnson Graph C Thomas, U Girish | | 2019 |
| New Lower Bound Techniques for the Query Complexity of Truthful Mechanisms C Thomas, U Girish | | 2019 |
| Verifying Robustness of Programs Under Structural Perturbations C Thomas, J Bond | | 2017 |
