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Clayton Thomas
Clayton Thomas
Postdoctoral Researcher, Microsoft Research New England
Подтвержден адрес электронной почты в домене microsoft.com - Главная страница
Название
Процитировано
Процитировано
Год
Strategyproofness-exposing mechanism descriptions
YA Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, C Thomas
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023
272023
The short-side advantage in random matching markets
L Cai, C Thomas
Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 257-267, 2022
212022
Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness
A Rubinstein, RR Saxena, C Thomas, SM Weinberg, J Zhao
Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2021
132021
Tiered random matching markets: Rank is proportional to popularity
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Saberi, C Thomas, G Zhao
arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.05124, 2020
112020
Classification of priorities such that deferred acceptance is OSP implementable
C Thomas
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 860-860, 2021
102021
Implementation in advised strategies: Welfare guarantees from posted-price mechanisms when demand queries are np-hard
L Cai, C Thomas, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04342, 2019
92019
Classification of priorities such that deferred acceptance is obviously strategyproof
C Thomas
arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.12367, 2020
82020
Structural complexities of matching mechanisms
YA Gonczarowski, C Thomas
Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 455-466, 2024
62024
Revisiting the primitives of transaction fee mechanism design
A Ganesh, C Thomas, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.07566, 2024
52024
Representing all stable matchings by walking a maximal chain
L Cai, C Thomas
arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04401, 2019
42019
Maximally recoverable codes: The bounded case
V Gandikota, E Grigorescu, C Thomas, M Zhu
2017 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and …, 2017
42017
Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis
YA Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, G Ishai, C Thomas
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024
22024
Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms
YA Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, C Thomas
2025
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
S Ron, C Thomas, SM Weinberg, Q Zhang
2024 IEEE 65th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2024
2024
Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive
C Thomas
arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.02142, 2024
2024
Explainable Mechanism Design
C Thomas
Princeton University, 2023
2023
On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.
YA Gonczarowski, C Thomas
CoRR, 2022
2022
Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms
Y Gonczarowski, O Heffetz, C Thomas
2022
Expansion in the Johnson Graph
C Thomas, U Girish
2019
New Lower Bound Techniques for the Query Complexity of Truthful Mechanisms
C Thomas, U Girish
2019
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Статьи 1–20