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Ariel Schvartzman
Ariel Schvartzman
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer with independent items via symmetries
P Kothari, S Singla, D Mohan, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019
322019
The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design
RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
232018
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
J Schneider, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 35:1-35:20, 2016
182016
Smoothed analysis of multi-item auctions with correlated values
A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 417-418, 2019
162019
Optimal mechanism design for single-minded agents
NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 193-256, 2020
152020
The fewest clues problem
ED Demaine, F Ma, A Schvartzman, E Waingarten, S Aaronson
Theoretical Computer Science 748, 28-39, 2018
142018
Approximately strategyproof tournament rules: On large manipulating sets and cover-consistence
A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg, E Zlatin, A Zuo
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 3:1-3:25, 2019
112019
Coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017), 2017
102017
On infinite separations between simple and optimal mechanisms
A Psomas, A Schvartzman Cohenca, S Weinberg
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 4818-4829, 2022
52022
Bounds for the communication complexity of two-player approximate correlated equilibria
YK Ko, A Schvartzman
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 24, 71, 2017
32017
Auto-bidding and auctions in online advertising: A survey
G Aggarwal, A Badanidiyuru, SR Balseiro, K Bhawalkar, Y Deng, Z Feng, ...
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 22 (1), 159-183, 2024
22024
On infinite separations between simple and optimal mechanisms: A converse of a theorem of hart and nisan
A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Manuscript, 2022
22022
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017)
JR Lee, I Panageas, G Piliouras, Z Allen-Zhu, L Orecchia, T Kaufman, ...
Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2017
22017
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.06545, 2016
22016
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World
G Aggarwal, A Perlroth, A Schvartzman, M Zhao
arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.02699, 2024
12024
Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling
S Assadi, V Kher, G Li, A Schvartzman
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 123-152, 2023
12023
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)
T Vidick
Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, 2020
12020
On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three
D Mikšaník, A Schvartzman, J Soukup
International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 33-47, 2024
2024
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities
D Pennock, A Schvartzman, E Xue
International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 174-188, 2024
2024
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C Alexandros Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2205.13039, 2022
2022
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